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Abstract
We test whether two key elements of the EU and euro area economic gover-
nance framework, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Strategy, have
had any impact on macroeconomic outcomes. We test this proposition using a
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach on a panel of over 30 countries, some of which
are non-EU (control group). Hence, the impact of the EU economic governance
pillars is evaluated based on both the performance before and after their appli-
cation as well as against the control group. We ￿nd strong and robust evidence
that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the Lisbon Strategy have had
a signi￿cant bene￿cial impact on ￿scal and economic performance outcomes.
We conclude that a profound reform of these pillars is needed to make them
work in the next decade.
Keywords: Stability and Growth Pact, Lisbon Strategy, euro area, Euro-
pean Union, governance, institutions.
JEL:5
ECB




This paper presents an ex post analysis of whether two key elements of the EU and euro 
area economic governance framework, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the 
Lisbon Strategy, have achieved their goals. Using a difference-in-difference approach in 
a panel setting, we look at a wide range of annual data coming from 36 countries, over a 
sample period from 1980 to 2010. We consider a large set of possible control variables, 
as well as variables which could interact with the success (or lack thereof) of the two EU 
governance pillars. Their performance EU is assessed both against the countries’ own 
past performance as well as a control group of non-euro area or non-EU countries, 
controlling for different national economy characteristics. 
Overall, our results indicate that so far economic governance in the EU and the euro area 
has had limited or no success. In particular, we find that  
 
1) The Stability and Growth Pact has had no overall effect on the behaviour of the 
primary balance. While it has increased the counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy it has also 
increased its sensitivity to the political business cycle; 
 
2) The Lisbon Strategy has had at best no impact on the behaviour of real per capita GDP 
growth, employment growth and labour productivity growth. 
 
For the SGP, an optimistic reading of our results is that finding no effect of the SGP on 
fiscal outcomes is an indicator of success since it implies that this institutional framework 
has prevented the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union to adversely affect 
fiscal behaviour, a risk that was emphasised widely in the run-up to the euro. However, 
we consider that an appropriate set of fiscal rules in a monetary union should go beyond 
the no-change outcome and impose greater fiscal discipline than otherwise, on account of 
the possible negative spillovers that fiscal profligacy in individual countries may have on 
other EMU participants whether via the single monetary policy or otherwise, as well as 
the possible reduction in market discipline for individual Member States brought about 
by a stable and solid single currency. Our results indicate that the SGP has not delivered 
according to this stricter benchmark.  
 
The main policy implication stemming from our analysis is that substantial progress, or a 
“quantum leap”, must be made in EU and euro area economic governance to ensure and 
enhance the gains of Economic and Monetary Union for the benefit of European citizens. 
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the global ￿nancial crisis euro area Member States have ex-
perienced unprecedented challenges to their public ￿nances in particular, and their
economic policies more generally. These challenges have exposed the weaknesses of
the two pillars of EU and euro area economic governance, namely the ￿scal frame-
work of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) on the one
hand, and the Lisbon Strategy (LS) on the other. Looking forward, it is essential to
strengthen both pillars of EU economic governance. Before we look forward, however,
we must set the record straight on the performance of these economic governance pil-
lars looking backward, in their ￿rst decade. This paper tries to answer this question:
have the SGP and the LS worked against the objectives that they were created for?
One main contribution of this paper is to extend beyond the EU and use non-EU
OECD countries as a control group in an econometric investigation of the e⁄ective-
ness of the SGP, applying a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach where the outcomes are
compared both in terms of their own past, for the group of countries which have been
subject to the "treatment" (the EU economic governance pillars), as well as the per-
formance of the countries in the control group, also taking into account the in￿ uence
of a set of control variables. This approach goes beyond most contributions so far on
the SGP which typically focus on EMU or EU countries alone (e.g. Gali and Perotti
2003, Annett 2006, Golinelli and Momigliano 2009, Bernoth et al. 2009). Moreover,
existing studies usually consider signi￿cantly shorter samples (among those that are
most related to our paper, Annett ends in 2004, and Gali and Perotti in 2002). In-
stead, we use annual data spanning from 1980 and up to 2009, covering 36 countries.
Finally, we test not only for the e⁄ect of the SGP on average ￿scal behaviour, but
also extend our analysis to other possible dimensions of its in￿ uence, such as the
degree of pro-cyclicality of ￿scal policy, its being subject to the political cycle, and
its responsiveness to market discipline.1
We also apply the same di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach vis-￿-vis the non-EU
OECD control group for the LS. In the case of the LS, our assessment comes at the
time of conclusion of the original reform agenda and when the European Union is
now ironing out the details of its successor strategy, Europe 2020. In this analysis, we
also include a number of control variables that have come up in the literature on the
political economy of structural reform. Unlike previous studies, we do not focus on
reform e⁄orts but rather on outcomes in terms of long term economic performance
measures. To our knowledge, this type of exercise has not been performed before, at
least in a systematic manner.
Our paper is related to several di⁄erent strands of the ￿scal policy literature,
in particular to three of them. One is the political economy of ￿scal policy. For
example, it has been emphasised that ￿scal pro￿ igacy may depend on the size and
1However, we don￿ t consider the complementarities between ￿scal policy and structural reforms
(as, for example, in Buti et al. 2009).7
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2 Literature review: the Stability and Growth Pact
There is already a copious literature on the SGP, to which for reasons of space we
cannot do full justice. Here we brie￿ y review a few of the issues that are most relevant
for our analysis.
Buti, Eij¢ nger and Franco note (2003) that the Maastricht convergence criteria
and, later, the SGP￿ s 3% de￿cit limit appeared acceptable to enforce ￿scal discipline
at a time when public ￿nances in a number of EU countries appeared to be on an
unsustainable path. In 1992, the EU￿ s average debt ratio was almost 60% of GDP;
by 1997, it had climbed to almost 75%. While this ratio fell to 63% in 2003, von
Hagen (2003) argues that this result cannot be directly attributed to the SGP and
is subject to two quali￿cations. First, the increase in the average debt ratio from
1992-1997 was driven mainly by debt expansion in only ￿ve countries. Second, the
decrease in the average debt ratio from 1997 to 2001 again saw small states outperform
large states, achieving a reduction in their debt ratios of almost 20 percentage points
(as against the average 5.3% reduction in large states￿debt ratios). Annett (2006)
uses these ￿ndings to re￿ne the argument that the SGP is inherently more suited to
small countries, suggesting that the SGP ￿could be suited to a subgroup of countries
that (i) are small and more likely to accept an external constraint; (ii) have the
potential for macroeconomic volatility and so appreciate an external anchor; and (iii)
rely on the commitment form of ￿scal governance.￿ Buiter (2005), writing on the
same period, states more bluntly that as regards sustainability ￿the SGP has made
a contribution...only where its prescriptions were incentive-compatible for the target
country, that is, aligned with that country￿ s domestic policy objectives.￿
As noted by von Hagen (2003), since most European countries had sizeable ￿scal
expansions during the 1970s and 1980s, a period of consolidation could be expected
in the 1990s irrespective of the Maastricht criteria or the SGP￿ s strictures. Thus,
we can interpret what FatÆs and Mihov (2003) described as countries￿"consolidation
fatigue" as an example of diminished incentive-compatibility. The ECB (2005) (see
also Morris et al. 2006) noted that, from 1999, ￿scal consolidation stalled or went into
reverse in most euro-area countries. Economic downturn in 2001 led to deterioration
in public ￿nances, putting an increasing number of Member States at risk of, or
￿rmly in, excessive de￿cit positions. Troubles in France and Germany led to the
"suspension" of the SGP and its eventual reform in 2005, a development viewed with
alarm by both the European Commission and the ECB.
More generally, Filipek and Schreiber (2010) state that until the onset of the
global ￿nancial crisis, the SGP appeared to be successful: countries were meeting their
Medium-Term Objectives (MTOs) and most had balanced budgets or even surpluses.
However, it would seem wrong to attribute this to the 2005 reform which in fact
weakened the Pact. Indeed, Buiter (2005) and Filipek and Schreiber agree that the
SGP did not provide the incentives for necessary restraint during upswings to create
room for expansionary measures during downturns. Furthermore, von Hagen (2003)9
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noted that the narrow focus of the SGP on annual de￿cits may keep governments
from adopting reform policies that might result in larger de￿cits initially before the
desired growth and employment e⁄ects kick in.
The implementation of the SGP has obviously been followed and evaluated also
by international institutions. The IMF (2010) emphasised how the crisis had exposed
three long-standing weaknesses in the euro area￿ s ￿scal framework. First, the SGP
had failed to encourage the buildup of su¢ cient bu⁄ers in good times and lower debt
to prudent levels, limiting room for manoeuvre in bad times. Second, ￿scal sur-
veillance￿ s narrow focus on procedural aspects and formal de￿cit limits, twinned with
Council￿ s reluctance to use binding legal instruments to mandate policy corrections in
EDP enforcement, aggravated structural ￿ aws. Third, the euro area ￿scal framework
lacked centralized crisis management and resolution capacities. The IMF (2010) thus
advocated a strengthening of economic governance in EMU with a focus on enforcing
budgetary discipline.
Finally, other research has considered more closely the connection between the
SGP and national ￿scal institutions and rules. Although the econometric analysis in
this paper does not delve into national ￿scal frameworks (as does for example Debrun
and Kumar 2007), it is worth considering this aspect of the SGP in terms of relevance
for our conclusions.
From a ￿ ￿scal institutionalist￿perspective, the SGP should be more successfully
combined with ￿commitment￿member states because it strengthens their rules-based
frameworks; while the legitimacy of delegation states￿ministers of ￿nance is under-
mined by the SGP because they no longer have room for manoeuvre (Hallerberg
2004). However, country speci￿c empirical evidence does not always ￿t this model
(Hodson 2009). Moreover, factors such as the role of veto players in the budgetary
process (e.g. German Bundesrat), or the degree of public spending decentralisation
(Afonso and Hautpmeier 2009) also seem to a⁄ect ￿scal outcomes.
In terms of the existing empirical research on the e⁄ects of the Stability and
Growth Pact, Table 1 presents an overview of existing studies and key results. The
general message arising from this literature (see e.g. Gali and Perotti 2003) is that
the SGP does not seem to have had a major impact on ￿scal behaviour in the euro
area. One important di⁄erence with our approach, as noted, is that these studies are
not based on di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates and cover signi￿cantly smaller sample
periods, typically up to the early to mid-2000s.
3 Data
The empirical analysis in the paper is based on annual data from 36, mostly advanced,
countries, a list of which is contained in Table 2. The sample includes 25 EU countries,
15 of which are in the euro area now, and 11 non-EU countries. Since most variables
are not available for all countries, in the regression analyses the country sample
numbers between 30 and 34. The sample period is 1980 to 2009.10
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4 A ￿rst look at the evidence
We ￿rst look at basic summary statistics for the key variables that are relevant de-
pending on whether countries are, or are not, subject to the SGP and to the LS.
The data are reported in Table 4. Of course, this only represents preliminary, uncon-
ditional evidence as it treats all countries in the same way, irrespective of possible
determinants, the only di⁄erence being whether they are subject to the modalities of
EU and euro area economic governance or not.
For ￿scal variables, the data look clearly better for countries which (and when
they) have been subject to the SGP. The average primary balance is +0.3% within
the SGP, and -1.2% without it. Countries under the SGP have also experienced
less variation, with a standard deviation of 3.3% (including both cross section and
time series variation) against 4.4%. Results are similar for the other de￿nitions of
the EU ￿scal rules that we propose (MAASTRICHT, SGP_PRE, SGP_PRE03).
Prima facie, therefore, one is tempted to conclude that the SGP has been a success
in increasing the average level as well as in reducing the standard deviation of the
primary balance. We will see, however, that this conclusion does not survive in the
conditional analysis, where we include other possible determinants of the primary
balance.
(insert Table 4 here)
Concerning the LS, the unconditional results are less promising. Average per
capita income growth, perhaps the best single yardstick of the LS (more discussion on
this later), has been 1.2% on average in the countries subject to the Lisbon Strategy,
against 2.4% in other countries (including EU countries before 2000), and with a
higher standard deviation.
5 The Stability and Growth Pact and ￿scal behav-
iour
5.1 Empirical model
We address the problem of evaluating the impact of the EU ￿scal institutions (the
SGP and Maastricht) in three sequential steps. First, we estimate a model of ex post
￿scal behaviour over the full set of countries (both EU and non-EU), similar to, for
example, Gali and Perotti (2003). The model is speci￿ed on the primary balance,
that is, not the cyclically adjusted budget balance. The choice of this left hand side
variable - rather than the more common cyclically adjusted one - is motivated by our
desire to study how the ￿scal institutions have shaped not only the average behaviour
of governments but also their responsiveness to the business cycle, that is, the degree
of pro-cyclicality of ￿scal policy.12
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given exogenously. There is indeed some evidence that countries joining the euro have
had (in the year preceding entry) a higher public debt to GDP ratio than countries
which have not adopted the euro. For example, the 11 countries which formed the
euro area in 1999 had a combined debt to GDP ratio of 64.3%, against 47.1% in
the remaining countries (a situation which has reversed since then). Since having a
higher debt may increase incentives towards ￿scal consolidation especially beyond a
certain level, our empirical approach may entail a small bias towards ￿nding a positive
e⁄ect for the ￿scal rule variables. Note that this is only relevant for the conditions
prevailing at the time of euro area (or EU) entry. The e⁄ect of higher or lower debt
over the whole sample is already captured in our model by the country ￿xed e⁄ect
(see Imbens and Wooldridge 2009, in particular page 70); we also include the lagged
debt to GDP ratio in the xit vector.3
5.2 Results
The results of the estimation of equation (1) are reported in Table 5. A high debt
to GDP ratio in the previous year, higher trade openness and economic size all con-
tribute to a better primary balance. By contrast, income per capita and the size of
government are statistically insigni￿cant. The result for economic size is interesting in
view of the consideration that larger countries typically have larger ￿scal multipliers
(Buti and Pench 2004); this may imply that they have less need for expansionary ￿s-
cal policies. The output gap is positive and signi￿cant, at around 0.3, indicating that
average ￿scal behaviour is counter-cyclical.4 We also test (second column) whether
there is any indication of asymmetry between a positive and a negative output gap,
and we ￿nd that the source of counter-cyclicality only comes from times in which the
output gap is positive (good times). Due to the relatively large size of the standard
errors, however, we are not able to conclude that the di⁄erence in the coe¢ cients
associated to positive and negative output gaps is statistically signi￿cant.5
In the third column, we add political variables taken from the Database of Political
Institutions. We consider several variables capturing (i) the political cycle, (ii) the
strength and cohesion of the government, (iii) political stability and (iv) a measure of
￿scal centralization. We ￿nd that years in which legislative elections take place are
strongly associated to a worse primary budget balance, by about 0.5% and statistically
highly signi￿cant. This con￿rms the existing widespread evidence in the literature
of a political business cycle in our sample of countries. We also ￿nd that the vote
share of the government parties is associated to better budgetary outcomes, indicating
that stronger governments are better able to keep the ￿scal house in order. Finally, a
3To deal with the problem of EMU entry endogeneity, Alesina, Ardagna and Galasso (2008) use
instead an instrumental variable approach, where the instruments are the estimated probabilities of
joining a monetary union.
4This result is very robust to changes in the instruments list.
5The Wald test is not reported for brevity.14
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of the euro in the 1990s. From the interaction term between economic size and the
SGP, we also ￿nd no evidence that smaller economies have systematically bene￿ted
more from the SGP contrary to what is suggested, for example, by von Hagen (2003)
and Annett (2006).
Finally, we want to establish whether the Stability and Growth Pact has a⁄ected
the role of market discipline which, as noted by many observers, seems to have op-
erated in quite an ine¢ cient way in EMU, with government bond spreads being ￿rst
very small and not reactive to ￿scal conditions, and then (from 2008 onwards) very
large and exceptionally responsive. What we want to test here is not whether gov-
ernment bond spreads react to ￿scal imbalances, as commonly acknowledged in the
literature, but rather the other way round, namely, if for given spreads the primary
balance reacts to market signals. In the last column of Table 7, therefore, we include
an interaction term between the SGP and the previous year￿ s long-term government
bond spread versus the United States Treasury bond yield, taken to represent a global
safe-asset benchmark. There is surprisingly little literature on the disciplining role
of the bond market on government behaviour. Lane (1993) sets out some general
conditions for market discipline to be e⁄ective. De Haan and Sturm (2000) study
government bond spreads in Europe and come to the conclusion that market disci-
pline is not very e⁄ective.8 Our results indicate that market discipline - as measured
by the in￿ uence of government bond spreads in the previous year on the current year￿ s
primary balance - does not seem to matter much in the determination of primary bal-
ances more generally, and this has been so also under the SGP. We also add squared
terms of these variables to capture possible non-linearities but these are again sta-
tistically insigni￿cant. Therefore, we take this as an indication that if the SGP has
had any e⁄ect, it is not through its in￿ uence on the working of market discipline on
government behaviour (although it may still have in￿ uenced market discipline meant
as the responsiveness of yield spreads to ￿scal imbalances).
(Insert Table 7 here)
6 The Lisbon Strategy and economic performance
Moving beyond the EU/euro area ￿scal rules, we consider the possible impact of the
Lisbon Strategy (LS) on structural economic performance. We look at outcomes and
do not consider reform e⁄orts. This distinguishes our paper from other papers such
as Duval and Elmeskov (2006) and Alesina, Ardagna and Galasso (2008), which have
tried inter alia to establish a link between the intensity of structural reforms and the
introduction of the euro. An important characteristic of the LS was precisely that it
did not focus on a particular set of structural reforms to be implemented, leaving in-
dividual EU countries much freedom under the central coordinating procedures of the
8Bulut (2009) also ￿nds little evidence of market discipline for sovereign borrowers of developing
countries.16
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general level of development of a country and society￿ s adaptability to the globali-
sation process. Under subjective factors, Koczor notes the importance of e¢ ciency
of governmental action, political will and the consensus for reform, the extent to
which non-governmental entities (employer and employee organisations) work with
the government to draft and implement the strategy, as well as the social acceptance
of reform.
Wyplosz (2010), in line with the call by Ioannou et al. (2008) for a more explicit
benchmarking, argues that the shift from pointed criticism to diplomatic peer pres-
sure from the Commission undermined the process. Further, he notes that ￿political
leaders are not raised to encourage critical comments from each other. More impor-
tantly, perhaps, while even polished exercises of apparent mutual admiration could
still exercise some pressure, political leaders never forget that they are accountable to
domestic voters.￿
Finally, Padoan (2009) sees an incomplete policy mix and a delay in capitalising on
a changing international environment as the main reasons for failure. The persistent
European de￿cit in R&D is, in his opinion, the result of a failure to promote the
emergence and growth of innovative businesses in new sectors.
6.1 Empirical model
For the empirical model we follow a similar approach as in Section 4. Let zit be an
indicator of economic performance that is relevant for the LS. We ￿rst estimate a
model
zit = ￿zi;t￿1 + ￿xit + ￿i + ￿t + "it (4)
where the performance indicator is regressed on a vector of possible fundamental
determinants x (possibly also timed t ￿ 1 where reverse causality is a potential con-
cern). Once we obtain a satisfactory parsimonious model for equation (4), we add
the dummy variables capturing the LS:
zit = ￿zi;t￿1 + ￿xit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿LISBONit + "it (5)
The coe¢ cient ￿ captures the additional e⁄ect, coming on top of all other control
variables, stemming from the fact that a given country is subject to a supra-national
process, the LS. To simplify things, ￿nding ￿ > 0 would imply that the LS has
"worked" and that its success is visible in the data. Also in this case, as for the
analysis of ex post ￿scal behaviour, we emphasise the risk of selection bias, as it
could well be that countries with structural weaknesses are precisely those which
undertake a stronger reform e⁄ort, in the same way as patients who are more ill are
more likely to take a certain medicine. In the case of the LS, this may be less of a
concern since it applies indistinctly to the whole EU and the decision to join the EU
(unlike, at least in part, the decision to join the euro area) largely re￿ ects geographical18
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and political determinants, not economic policy objectives.9 Furthermore, this is if
anything a source of bias in the direction of ￿nding ￿ > 0; rather than the other way
round.
It should be recalled that the LS was an overarching strategy entailing not only an
economic but also a social and environmental dimension. This was indeed identi￿ed
as one of its weaknesses and may explain the poor performance in economic terms. We
focus on the economic dimension and take three indicators as best overall measures of
economic performance: (i) per capita income growth, (ii) labour productivity growth,
and (iii) employment growth.
6.2 Results
Table 8 reports the results for per capita income growth. In estimating equation (4)
and retaining the signi￿cant variables, we ￿nd that a few variables are robustly asso-
ciated to per capita income growth. First, initial conditions matter: the lagged per
capita income level has a negative sign, suggesting some catching up process. Second,
trade openness is associated to stronger per capita income growth, as is (surprisingly
from one angle but see below) a higher level of Employment Protection Legislation.
Turning to the political and institutional variables, we ￿nd that Political Stability
(note that a higher reading of this indicator implies less stability) and Proportional
Representation are associated to higher per capita growth. The results indicate that
countries with lower income per capita, higher trade openness, more employment
protection, more political stability and with a proportional political system tend to
experience higher per capita income growth. We also try a number of additional vari-
ables that turn out to be insigni￿cant. We try the World Bank Rule of Law indicator,
as in Rodrik et al. (2004), but we ￿nd this variable insigni￿cant, though correctly
signed. The insigni￿cance is likely to be linked to two main di⁄erences between the
analysis in this paper and Rodrik et al. (2004). First, we look at per capita income
growth rather than levels. Second, our panel includes mostly rich countries, while the
quality of institutions (such as the protection of property rights) are likely to explain
the di⁄erence between poor and rich countries rather than the smaller di⁄erences
among rich countries. Furthermore, economic size is also insigni￿cant when included
together with openness (though it is signi￿cant when included alone). Finally, we
also try several variables capturing the country￿ s political institutions, ￿nding all of
them insigni￿cant (apart from those reported in Table 7).10
(Table 8 here)19
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TABLE 1. Synoptic table: Empirical literature on the effects of the SGP 
Author(s) Estimation 
approach /  
method







x Positive impact of the SGP on the 
primary balance, but not on primary 
expenditure.
x Negative impact of the electoral 
cycle. 













x No significant evidence of a pro-
cyclical bias in downturns induced 
by the SGP. 
x Tighter policies when public 
indebtedness grows. 
x The policy is a-cyclical in case of 
positive output gap. 
x Fiscal decentralisation contributes 















x The differences between real-time 
and ex post data are substantial and 
tend to be systematic across time. 
x No major differences between 
OECD and euro area countries 
when it comes to fiscal reaction in 
bad times. 






x Discretionary fiscal policy in EMU 
countries has become more 
countercyclical over time, as 
observed in other countries, even if 
OECD countries are more 
countercyclical.  
x Decline in public investment 
experienced over the last decade by 
EMU countries is also part of a 
global trend and is smaller than in 
OECD countries. 
Annett (2006)  Panel / 




x Asymmetric success in the 
implementation of the SGP is 
linked to the size, volatility as well 
as commitment policy of each euro 
area country.  






x The pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies 
only arises in the ex post data.
x Real time data suggests that 
policymakers have tried to run 
counter-cyclical discretionary 
policy, but find it hard to do. 
Note:  LSDVc is the least square dummy variable estimator corrected for a dynamic panel data
setting; FE is the fixed-effect estimator; FE-IV is the fixed effect estimator using instrumenta
l  variables to deal with the endogeneity problem; 2SLS is the two-stage least square estimator
; 
GMM is the generalised method of moments estimator; FD GMM is the first-difference 
GMM (Blundell-Bond) estimator. 27
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Working Paper Series No 1344
May 2011
The full sample goes from 1980 to 2010 (annual data). 
TABLE 4. Unconditional moments of the primary balance and per capita growth 
Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Primary balance
Full sample 956 -0.92 4.31
No SGP 806 -1.17 4.42
SGP 150 0.39 3.39
No SGP_PRE 778 -1.27 4.44
SGP_PRE 178 0.58 3.3
No MAASTRICHT 662 -1.41 4.56
MAASTRICT 294 0.18 3.46
No SGP_PRE03 899 -1.12 4.33
SGP_PRE03 57 2.16 2.36
Per capita growth
Full sample 964 2.2 3.7
No Lisbon 774 2.4 3.5
Lisbon 190 1.2 4.4
Note: See text for the definition of the dummy variables. All data are in percentage points per year. The f30
ECB
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DiScretionary  
FiScal PolicieS  
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and Jacopo Cimadomo